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ORIGINALISM OFF THE GROUND: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS BAUDE AND
SACHS
Eric J. Segall*
Professors Will Baude and Stephen Sachs are a legal realist’s
worst nightmare. In their Northwestern Law Review essay
“Grounding Originalism,”1 they continue their Arthurian quest to
convince the legal world that originalism has been and currently
is our law. They denote this effort a “positivist” account of our
legal practices and claim theirs is a more accurate description of
constitutional law than competing theories such as common law
constitutionalism and pluralistic decision-making. Although they
discuss H.L.A. Hart and contemporary philosophers, they
concede that “the more enduring dispute between us and many of
our critics is far more banal: it’s a simple empirical disagreement.
Maybe our beliefs seem odd . . . because other readers don’t see
how our existing legal practice grounds a form of originalism.”2
As one of their critics,3 our disagreements, far from being
“banal,” implicate fundamental principles of constitutional
interpretation and judicial transparency. To legal realists, and
most political scientists who study the Supreme Court, originalism
is just one of many methods of constitutional discourse, and only
a slight one. Far from being our law, originalism is used by judges
mainly as a rhetorical device to justify decisions reached on other
grounds.4 There is substantial data, as well as detailed descriptive
accounts by experts, that strongly suggest that where judges have
* Kathy & Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of
Law. Thanks to Richard Primus and Heidi Kitrosser for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
1. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
1455 (2019) [hereinafter Grounding Originalism].
2. Id. at 1477.
3. See Richard A. Posner & Eric J. Segall, Faux Originalism, 20 GREEN BAG 2d 109
(2016).
4. See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 156–57 (2018) [hereinafter FAITH].
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legal discretion, their values, experiences, and politics determine
the sum and substance of our law.5 Those values, experiences, and
politics, as this essay will show, do not reflect the values of people
living in 1787 or 1868, or the law of that time, but our judges’
values today. The weakest aspect of Baude and Sachs’ recent
essay, and their other detailed and complicated efforts to portray
originalism, not just as part of our law, but as our law, is their
failure to wrestle directly with legal realist and political science
critiques of judicial decision-making.
In Grounding Originalism, Baude and Sachs describe
constitutionalism at such a high level of abstraction that they fail
to see how non-originalist values drive the substance of our actual
law. They also concede that “originalism can be a correct
descriptive account of our legal system, even if few people would
currently describe our system that way.”6 That claim does not
sound in legal positivism, which presumably requires an account
of how people actually think about, describe, and then act towards
our real legal practices on the ground.
This essay starts by summarizing Baude and Sachs’
arguments. Then it shows that their account, ironically given their
self-professed positivism, fails to wrestle with court decisions on
the ground. They try to make up for that failure by claiming
judicial decisions aren’t law, and by categorizing obviously nonoriginalist opinions as originalist, but they are mistaken in both
views at least to the extent they purport to care about how
constitutional law operates as opposed to philosophic and
linguistic academic debates far removed from legal practice. This
essay concludes that if Baude and Sachs are going to continue
their zeal to claim originalism is our law, they inevitably must
directly address the legal realist account of judicial decisionmaking and show why it is inaccurate.
1. THE CORE CLAIMS
In Grounding Originalism, Baude and Sachs distill their prior
work into three “core claims.” First, “[t]heories of legal
interpretation ought to give more emphasis to questions of law.
Whatever a theory’s conceptual elegance or normative
attractions, it also matters whether that theory already reflects our
5.
6.

See id.; infra Part 3.
Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at 1465.
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law, or is instead a call for law reform.”7 Second, “the particular
rules of our legal system happen to endorse a form of originalism.
Our law today incorporates our original law by reference.”8 Third,
“[t]he binding force of our original law has important
consequences for the present day. . . . The original-law approach
may be capacious in theory, but it’s exacting in application.”9
These three “core claims” can be summarized as follows: A
theory of legal interpretation must reflect our actual practices, not
recommendations for changing those practices. Our legal system
as it has existed and currently exists is one of originalism, meaning
our law is the founders’ law until it is lawfully changed according
to well-accepted principles approved by the founders. This claim
does not mean that legal outcomes never change but rather they
must change in accordance with the founders’ rules for how legal
change can occur. Baude and Sachs also argue that this descriptive
account can be accurate even in the face of a strong pattern of
non-originalist judicial outcomes.10
Despite non-originalist decisions, they argue, we measure
and discuss constitutional law cases in the context of originalist
arguments and evidence. Moreover, they claim that “[o]riginal
meaning sometimes explicitly prevails over policy arguments in
constitutional adjudication, but the reverse doesn’t seem to be
true,” and “there are no clear repudiations of originalism as our
law in the current canon of Supreme Court cases, even in
situations where the Justices must have been sorely tempted.”11
In sum, our law is the original law, as changed according to
the original rules for change, and the important participants in our
legal and political systems act as if both accounts are true.
2. THE ORIGINAL LAW ISN’T OUR LAW
Baude and Sachs’ description of originalism’s place in our
current law does not reflect how the American people, nonjudicial governmental actors, and judges participate in our legal
and political systems. I have argued, as have others, that the
Court’s constitutional law jurisprudence is far removed from our
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 1457.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1458 (quotation omitted).
See id. at 1476–77.
Id. at 1477–78.
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original Constitution, as amended, and the day-to-day operations
of our law are not the “founder’s’ law.”12 The examples of
country-changing non-originalist Supreme Court decisions fill
casebooks, treatises, and law review articles. For example,
University of Richmond Law Professor Jud Campbell recently
and persuasively argued that the Court’s complicated and
comprehensive common law free speech doctrines have not been
justified (and probably could not be justified) by the First
Amendment’s original meaning.13
Although there have been a few valiant efforts to the
contrary, the dominant academic view is that Brown v. Board of
Education is also inconsistent with an originalist method of
constitutional interpretation,14 as are the recent same-sex
marriage cases.15 Baude and Sachs themselves have previously
listed a bevy of important cases they think might be inconsistent
with the Constitution’s original meaning, including Reynolds v.
Sims’ blockbuster one-person, one-vote holding, the Court’s
standing doctrine as articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
and many of the Court’s important commerce clause cases giving
Congress almost unlimited power to regulate local economic
activities.16 I could, and I’m guessing they could, go on and on, and
then on some more.
If this much of constitutional law is non-originalist, how can
originalism possibly be our law? Baude and Sachs make two
specific responses and one general one. Their first rebuttal,
fleshed out in greater detail in other works, is that some decisions
that most scholars label non-originalist actually derive from
originalist criteria and reasoning (even if they are right about this,
which they are not, as noted above they too have pointed to a
12. See FAITH, supra note 4, at 172–73; Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?,
116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44, 51 (2016).
13. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246
(2017); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 491 (2016) (“[I]t
is far from clear that ‘the right to criticize
Government’ is the original meaning of the First Amendment.”).
14. See Ronald Turner, The Problematics of the Brown-Is-Originalist Project, 23 J.L.
& POL’Y 591 (2015).
15. See Orin Kerr, Is There an Originalist Case for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage?,
WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/is-there-an-originalist-case-for-a-right-to-same-sexmarriage/?utm_term=.4812faa6c10f.
16. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2d
103, 108 (2016).
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hefty chunk of non-originalist decisions). Thus, in a prior work,
Baude argued that Obergefell v. Hodges,17 despite language which
many interpret as rejecting originalism, actually embraces
originalism. Here is the language in question:
[T]he generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the
extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted
to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons
to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight
reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections
and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be
addressed.18

It is difficult to imagine a stronger rejection of originalism
than this passage. Nevertheless, in his essay “Is Originalism Our
Law,” Baude argued that “this sort of living originalism” amounts
to the Court asking the right questions and doing “what an
inclusive originalist would do.”19 Thus, “even in one of its most
potentially anti-originalist moments, the Court ultimately claimed
fidelity to the Amendment’s original authors.”20
Baude made similar arguments about non-originalist
passages in Brown v. Board of Education and other cases by
essentially saying that these cases asked the right question: what
did the Fourteenth Amendment originally require judges to do?
And if the answer is to allow evolutionary decision-making by
judges based on changed facts and values, then those decisions are
part of the originalist canon.21 In “Grounding Originalism,”
Baude and Sachs restate this idea as “the Founder’s’ law allowed
for various kinds of changes,” including a form of living
constitutionalism where judges may find that “[a] given rule of law
may be a function of what the custom is today, because that’s what
the Founder’s’ law prescribed back then, which is what our law
tells us to care about today.”22
As I’ve argued elsewhere, both on my own, and with retired
Judge Richard Posner,23 if Baude and Sachs are correct that
17.
18.
19.
(2015).
20.
21.
22.
23.

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Id. at 2598 (emphasis added).
William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2382–83
Id. at 2383.
See Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at 1491.
Id.
Posner & Segall, supra note 3.
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sometimes, maybe even much of the time, the founders’
instruction to judges was to take into account contemporary
values and judgments, then originalism and non-originalism
merge, and we could just as easily say living constitutionalism and
pluralistic methods of constitutional interpretation are “our law.”
Many if not most non-originalist constitutional law professors and
judges also claim that their respective methods are grounded in
fidelity to constitutional practice, history, and meaning. They
argue that the application of vague constitutional text to new
circumstances requires the selection of judicial value choices
because hard cases have always required judges to make such
choices, as the founders expected by using such imprecise
language.24 This argument sounds similar to the observations
made by Baude and Sachs quoted above. For the constitutional
provisions that most often lead to litigation (we don’t need
theories of interpretation for precise text such as the President has
to be 35), originalism and non-originalism require the same
evolutionary analysis, and there is little at stake between adopting
one label or the other.
Baude and Sachs also argue in “Grounding Originalism” that
lawyers, judges, writers of amicus briefs, and virtually everyone
else involved in trying to flesh out constitutional meaning employ
originalist arguments to support their own views and criticize their
opponents’ arguments.25 They are correct that advocates and
judges employ historical arguments where they can, but Baude
and Sachs ignore the reality that constitutional players also use
policy and value judgments to criticize Court decisions. The
Justices’ abortion decisions were wrong because the fetus is a
human being,26 same-sex marriage dooms traditional marriage,27

24. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 22 U. HAW. L. REV.
385, 494 (2000).
25. See Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at 1484–85.
26. See Brief for Wisconsin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Box v.
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., No. 18-483 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-483/72184/20181115122354603_18483%20Brief%20of%20States%20of%20Wisconsin%20et%20al%20Supporting%20
Petitioners.pdf.
27. See Brief for 100 Scholars of Marriage as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-574),
https://www.scribd.com/document/261172376/100-Scholars-of-Marriage-Amicus-Brief.
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Citizens United increases the role of money in politics,28
affirmative action programs lead to stigma and backlash,29 and so
on. Constitutional law comes with a heavy mix of legal and policy
content, and Baude and Sachs have not tried to make an empirical
showing that one transcends the other. We could say “policy
arguments are our law.”
Additionally, to say that scholars, lawyers, and judges
regularly employ originalist arguments means very little given
that there are as many different versions of originalism as there
are competing theories of constitutional interpretation. As
Professors Peter Smith and Tom Colby have repeatedly shown,
originalism is “not a single, coherent, unified theory of
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct
constitutional theories that share little in common except a
misleading reliance on a single label.”30 Some originalists think
that strong judicial deference is an essential part of originalism,
others think judges have a duty of clarity which is not quite as
deferential, while most so-called New Originalists, and even some
traditional ones, think judges should aggressively review state and
federal laws.31
There are originalists who believe in the interpretationconstruction distinction suggesting a difference between the
semantic, non-legal meaning of constitutional text and the
application of that text to hard cases, while other originalists think
that it is “Orwellian to describe [a theory that leaves room for
construction] as ‘originalist’ in any meaningful sense of that
term.”32 Given the wide latitude originalists have to make their
arguments while retaining the label “originalist,” virtually any
legal theory today can be comfortably placed inside that rubric
(Baude and Sach’s’ views that Obergefell might be so classified is
28. See Michael Beckel & Jared Bennett, 12 Ways “Citizens United” Has Changed
Politics, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 21, 2015), https://publicintegrity.org/federalpolitics/12-ways-citizens-united-has-changed-politics/.
29. See Brief of Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor, Jr. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-345),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Sander-Taylor-brief.pdf.
30. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244
(2009).
31. See FAITH, supra note 4, at 82–121 (discussing the many different flavors of
originalism).
32. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism”
Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1509 (2012).
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a classic example). If that is what Baude and Sachs mean by
originalism is our law, that observation is basically a truism with
little relevance to cases on the ground or the arguments that
lawyers make and judges adopt or reject.
The strong claim by Baude and Sachs that “[o]riginal
meaning sometimes explicitly prevails over policy arguments in
constitutional adjudication, but the reverse doesn’t seem to be
true,”33 is just not accurate. They don’t provide evidence in their
article supporting this claim, but an entire era of Warren Court
constitutional law was based mostly on justice and fairness while
often ignoring or minimizing text and history.34 The landmark
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,35 finding a right to privacy to
use contraception, which was later used in Roe v. Wade, is four
pages long without any historical analysis. The supremely
important decision in Reynolds v. Sims,36 laying down the oneperson, one-vote rule, has no originalist content while the dissent
relied on the long judicial history and tradition allowing states to
choose their own redistricting methods.37
As noted earlier, Sims is on Baude and Sachs’ list of
potentially non-originalist cases, a fair observation, but the case
does show that overt policy concerns can trump originalist sources
even in the most important cases. The list of such examples is long
and includes the Court’s libel and slander jurisprudence, gay
rights cases, affirmative action decisions striking down state and
federal racial preferences without a word about the original
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and many
others. Contrary to Baude and Sachs’ account, when it comes to
Supreme Court decisions, in the words of Richard Primus, “[i]t is
what the Court has been doing that is our law, and a big part of
what the Court has been doing is deciding cases . . . in ways that
are not consistent with original meanings.”38
The last move made by Baude and Sachs to support their
claim that originalism is our law (despite the enormous evidence
to the contrary) is to suggest that court decisions aren’t law at all
33. See Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at 1477.
34. See FAITH, supra note 4, at 52–55 (describing important non-originalist Warren
Court decisions).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. See id. at 589 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Primus, supra note 12, at 51–52 (cited in Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at
1464).
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(even though they may be binding) and therefore even when
those decisions are wrong on an originalist basis, all that means is
that the Court didn’t follow the rules correctly, not that
originalism isn’t the rule (or our law). They argue the following:
[U]nder our system’s rules of precedent, legal actors are
sometimes commanded to follow a Supreme Court decision
“as if” it were the law—even as the underlying legal materials,
which command ultimate authority, prescribe a different
result. . . . [L]ower courts can be bound to an erroneous
Supreme Court decision by principles of stare decisis, requiring
them to treat the decision “as if” it properly stated the law. This
“as if” law can be binding on particular actors without thereby
becoming the law—much the way a runner can be called “out”
by an umpire and treated as if he were “out” for the remainder
of the game, though in truth he actually touched the plate first
and was safe.39

Elsewhere, Sachs has argued that legal opinions can be a
“source of law,” and can be res judicata or the law of the case, but
“each does so by treating the judicial decision as if it were law,
and not by substituting that decision for the underlying legal
standards on which it’s based.”40 For example, he argues, the
Fourth Circuit’s decisions are binding in Maryland but not
Delaware, “even though the same Fourth Amendment applies in
each state.” Moreover,
[t]he same theory can be applied to courts of last resort. . . .
[T]here’s no reason why the holdings of a court like the
Supreme Court of the United States must necessarily be taken
to represent ‘the law,’ as opposed to ‘the law of the Supreme
Court,’ binding on other courts within the reach of its appellate
jurisdiction.41

Arguing that judicial decisions are not law is a key move for
Baude and Sachs. They are trying to bridge the gap from their
concession that much of our judge-made law isn’t originalist to
their conclusion that our actual law is still originalist because
judicial decisions aren’t law like the Constitution (and statutes)
are law. When umpires make mistakes, the rules of baseball don’t
change, and when judges make mistakes, the rules of

39.
40.
41.

Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at 1472 (footnotes omitted).
Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 561 (2019).
Id. 562–63.
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constitutional law (originalist methods) don’t change, or so they
argue.
The problem with this theory is that, for all practical
purposes, Supreme Court decisions are the supreme law of the
land until such decisions are reversed either by courts or
constitutional amendment. It does not matter what academics or
philosophers say about whether these decisions are “law” any
more that it matters whether an umpire’s call was right or wrong
once the game is over and the outcome determined. Critics
labeling a legal decision incorrect because it is inconsistent with
our founder’s’ original law does not deprive that decision of its
status as binding law to the people of the United States, local and
state governments, Congress, and the President. As I’ve argued
elsewhere:
[F]or all practical purposes, the Constitution means what the
Supreme Court says it means, which is why Georgia can’t yet
prohibit all abortions, Montana can’t regulate corporate
political speech the way it wants to, and Alabama must
recognize same-sex marriages. Philosophers can debate
whether court decisions are “law,” in a technical sense . . . and
we can all debate whether or not originalism is our law as a
theoretical manner. But two things are true: 1) constitutional
law evolves and changes every term even though the text
remains exactly the same, and 2) non-judicial political actors
and the American people treat court decisions as law from
traffic courts all the way up to the Supreme Court. That being
the case, it is more than perplexing . . . that legal positivists
would argue that court-made law isn’t real law.42

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,43 Justices Souter, O’Connor
and Kennedy announced that our “Constitution is a covenant
running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to
future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation
must learn anew that the Constitution’s written terms embody
ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one.”44
Whether or not these words have the status of law, they describe
a system of law that is decidedly non-originalist, which brings us
back to the most important argument Baude and Sachs make
42. Eric Segall, Are Court Decisions Law, and Why that Matters to Whether
Originalism
Is
Our
Law,
DORF
ON
LAW
(Feb.
11,
2019),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2019/02/are-court-decisions-law-and-why-that.html.
43. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
44. Id. at 901.
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about why originalism is our law. They claim that “[a] given rule
of law may be a function of whatever the custom is today, because
that’s what the Founders’ law prescribed back then, which is what
our law tells us to care about today.”45 If each generation of judges
can redefine what the vague text of the Constitution means to
them, today, because that is what the founders’ wanted them to
do back then, then it doesn’t matter whether legal opinions are
law or just binding pieces of paper because the founders’ law
allows judges to reject the values, principles, and judgments of the
relevant ratification eras in today’s legal cases. If that makes
originalism our law, the theory applies equally to most forms of
living constitutionalism.
3. REALIST AND POLITICAL SCIENCE CRITIQUES
The even deeper flaw in the picture Baude and Sachs paint
of our system of constitutional law and constitutional judging has
to do with how judges decide constitutional cases. As I argued in
my recent book “Originalism as Faith,” and as legal realists and
most political scientists have long believed, “legal sources such as
text, history, precedent, and prior positive law play less of a role
in the justices’ decision making than their political and personal
values.”46 There is a vast academic literature supporting these
As
Dean
Chemerinsky
famously
said,
arguments.47
“[c]onstitutional law is now, will be, and always has been, largely
a product of the views [and values] of the Justices.”48 Less
theoretically, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse recently claimed that
from 2006–2018, in cases raising direct political stakes the GOP
cared about regarding elections, voting, campaign finance reform,
and related issues, the GOP-controlled Supreme Court voted in
73 out of 73 cases in ways that supported the Republican Party.49
Even if that number were 63 out of 73, the point would remain

45.
46.
47.

Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at 1491 (emphasis added).
FAITH, supra note 4, at 156.
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
48. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 100
(1989).
49. See Sheldon Whitehouse, There’s a ‘Crisis of Credibility’ at the U.S. Supreme
Court, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
2019/02/15/sen-whitehouse-theres-a-crisis-of-credibility-at-the-u-s-supreme-court/
?slreturn=20190121083108.
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that the best descriptor of those cases would not be “originalist”
but rather a combination of GOP values and politics.
In “Grounding Originalism,” Baude and Sachs offer two
brief, almost perfunctory responses to the idea that the Court is a
“super legislature” where text and history play second fiddle to
values and politics. First, they argue the following:
[B]ut if the Supreme Court really is a super-legislature, its
members have some odd preferences regarding their policy
agenda. . . . [I]nstead of acting like normal legislators and
addressing salient topics like tax rates or gas prices, the Justices
instead possess an extensive desire to meddle around in federal
sentencing, an outsized and politically unpredictable interest in
the details of criminal procedure, and an abiding fascination
with Internet pornography.50

This argument, that the Court has an “odd policy agenda,” is
beside the point. The Court, of course, chooses its own agenda,
and there is little or no discussion anywhere in the literature
regarding whether the Justices use originalist criteria when doing
so. More importantly, the Court doesn’t decide to hear seventyfive front-page, hot-button cases a year because if they did, the
Justices’ political value judgments would be clear to everyone. If
most of the Court’s cases dealt with abortion, affirmative action,
gun reform, and the like, the “law gig” would be up. But nothing
in Baude’ and Sachs’ article wrestles with the reality that
conservative Justices usually vote for conservative results while
liberal Justices reliably vote for liberal results, regardless of what
text and history show. The fact that the Court often hears disputes
that don’t raise political stakes tells us little about the role
originalism plays in the most important cases. Currently, “our
law” of abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance reform,
separation of powers, gay rights, the commerce clause, and
numerous other hugely important topics simply has very little to
do with the original meaning of the Constitution, and a lot to do
with the political values of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and
Anthony Kennedy, one of whose votes was needed in virtually
every divided constitutional law decision from 1988–2018. Neither
Justice can be fairly characterized as an originalist.
The second argument made in Grounding Originalism that is
relevant to the realist critique is that the authors suggest that the
50.

Grounding Originalism, supra note 1, at 1490 (footnotes omitted).
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reasons and arguments litigators use to advance their client’s’
cases, and the reasons the Justices use to explain their decisions,
often sound in originalism even if the results are inconsistent with
our founders’ law. They point to the recent Emoluments litigation
and the avalanche of scholarly originalist arguments on all sides,
and conclude the following:
[C]lients spend good money hiring lawyers to dig up originalist
evidence—the stronger the evidence, the better—which is then
treated as meaningful even by those who rarely describe
themselves as originalists. This suggests that originalism isn’t
merely something at which to genuflect before moving on to
the real grounds of decision, for then the quality of originalist
argument wouldn’t matter so much. If originalism is a ritual,
it’s a ritual that obeys the full form of legal argument. If
originalism is a pretense, the pretense runs deep.51

There are serious omissions in these arguments. First, as
noted earlier, there are generations of important Supreme Court
cases that don’t spend any time on originalist arguments. Baude
and Sachs respond that “citation practices don’t tell us all (or even
most) of what we want to know about the deep structure of law.”52
Maybe not, but the “deep structure of the law” doesn’t resolve
cases, judges do. The history of the Supreme Court, according to
legal realists and the vast majority of political scientists, is mostly
the history of politics and values, not text and history, and the
evidence is in the cases themselves. Baude and Sachs are making
an empirical point when they claim that the deep structure of our
law is originalist, but they have so far failed to make any showing
through detailed case analysis that they are right. Conversely,
legal realists and political scientists have devoted enormous time
and effort to parsing actual language and results of Supreme
Court cases and comparing those to the Justices’ well-known
political views to support the realist case that values not law
determine constitutional outcomes.53 It takes data to beat data,

51. Id. at 1485–86 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 1481.
53. See Chemerinsky, supra note 48; Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism,’ 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 171 (2009) (“[I]n a great many cases, judges seem to
conclude that the relevant original meanings support the same results that we suspect they
would reach if they had not consulted original meanings. To whatever extent that suspicion
is justified, original meanings are not functioning as constraining rules.”); Jacobus
tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional
Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1939).
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case law to beat case law, and Baude and Sachs have not
attempted such an analysis.
Finally, almost the entire point of legal realism is that legal
doctrine generally, including originalism, is a “pretense that runs
deep.” Judges aren’t historians, but they know how to put
together favorable arguments and discredit unfavorable ones to
support their value judgments. Even in those few cases that
contain substantial historical content, such as District of Columbia
v. Heller,54 and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,55 involving
issues of first impression and therefore the examination of first
principles, the Justices’ uses of history are both amateurish and
inevitably circle back to their political priors, not a sincere effort
to understand the founders’ law.56
Given the strong correlation between the Justices’ values and
their votes over more than 150 years of constitutional decisionmaking, the burden of showing that non-values-based, originalist
reasons best describe our law falls squarely on Baude and Sachs,
and so far they have not illustrated their abstract arguments with
detailed discussions of constitutional law doctrine. Until they do
so, originalism might be our law in some academic, theoretical
sense, but on the ground, where we look to the Supreme Court
for binding rules relating to abortion, affirmative action,
federalism, separation of powers, and other hugely important
questions, our rules reflect the Justices’ values, not the values of
people who lived long ago.
CONCLUSION
In one of the most influential Supreme Court separation of
powers cases in our history, Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,57 Justice Robert H. Jackson said the following:
[J]ust what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be

54. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (invalidating D.C. law banning handguns).
55. 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (invalidating Arkansas term limits on members of Congress).
56. See FAITH, supra note 4, at 141–47 (arguing virtually no historians agree with
either the majority or dissent in Heller); Eric Segall, Justice Kennedy’s Constitution and
Why We Need It Now More Than Ever, DORF ON LAW (June 5, 2017),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/justice-kennedys-constitution-and-why.html
(observing that the key vote in Thornton was Justice Kennedy’s, who eschewed history for
values).
57. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and
a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net
result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from
respected sources on each side of any question. They largely
cancel each other.58

This famous statement applies equally to virtually every
litigated area of constitutional law.59 In the most important civil
rights case the Court ever decided,60 the Court said the following:
[I]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back
to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way
can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.61

The most important swing Justice of our (and probably any)
generation had this to say about originalism:
[H]ad those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and
proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles
in their own search for greater freedom.62

If originalism is our law, the Supreme Court is doing a great
job hiding that fact from the American people. More accurately,
originalism is a cover for personal values, or less pejoratively, a
matter of faith for the American people, legal scholars, and judges
to pretend the Court cares about text and history when deciding
cases when what the Justices really privilege are their own prior
decisions, values, and politics. The history of constitutional law
jurisprudence is not fidelity to the founders’ views but judges
applying their own values to vague principles in the context of new

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See FAITH, supra note 4 , at 156–70.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 492–93.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).

3 - SEGALL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

328

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/11/19 6:28 PM

[Vol. 34:413

problems. Originalism may or may not be a valid aspiration, but
it is not our law in any way that matters, down here on the ground.

